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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Plaintiff Terry Mitchell (“Mitchell”), when she was a vulnerable
sixteen-year old, suffered sexual abuse at the hands of Defendant Richard
Roberts (“Roberts”). At the time of the abuse, Roberts was a Department of
Justice attorney prosecuting Joseph Paul Franklin, the murderer of two of
Mitchell’s friends. Mitchell was unable to confront Roberts and seek justice
until after the statute of limitations had run, in part because of Roberts’s
manipulations, coercion, and threats. However, the Utah Legislature
provided a window of opportunity for some semblance of justice and
accountability, allowing for time-barred claims of child sexual abuse to be
brought. Utah Code § 78B-2-308 (“H.B. 279”).
After the havoc he has wrought on the lives of others, Roberts contends
that perpetrators of child sexual abuse, as well as the families of those
perpetrators, should be able to “organize their lives and put the past behind
them,” 1 without ever facing their victims in court and being held to account.
Now that he himself stands to be judged, Roberts urges this Court to
invalidate the revival statute. He does so without any constitutional analysis,

1

Brief of Richard Warren Roberts (“Roberts Brief”), at 11.
1

by relying on dicta from a few court cases, and ignoring the overwhelming
body of law requiring the courts to give effect to Utah’s revival statute.
Roberts would have the Court exercise a judicial veto, declaring that the
right to rely on a statute of limitations defense is so sacrosanct that it is
wholly beyond the power of the Legislature, more important even than what
this Court has held to be “fundamental” rights.
Roberts’s views on the law are entirely wrong. Utah law is settled that
the Legislature may retroactively enlarge, impair, or eliminate “vested
rights,” so long as the Legislature clearly expresses that intention. The
Certified Questions result from one anomalous case from this Court—
contradicted by cases both before and after it was issued—which held, on an
issue that was barely briefed, that a statute could not be applied retroactively
if it eliminated a “vested right.”
Our system of government, with a separation of powers, requires that
the judiciary refrain from contradicting the express will of the Legislature
unless it is in irreconcilable conflict with a constitutional limitation. Nothing
in the United States or Utah Constitutions limits the ability of the Legislature
to allow the victims of child sexual abuse to have a renewed chance to seek
justice. Where the Legislature has carefully evaluated the interests of victims
2

of child sexual abuse and defendants to determine that a revival of timebarred claims is necessary, the statute passes any test of constitutionality
articulated by this Court.
ARGUMENT

I.

Unredressed Child Sexual Abuse Presents a Compelling Need
for the Revival of Time-Barred Claims.
“Until recently the sexual abuse of children was the perfect crime. The

perpetrator was fairly guaranteed that he would never be caught or
successfully prosecuted. Now women—and men—have begun to use the
courts to hold them accountable . . . .” Erin Khorram, Crossing the Limit Line:
Sexual Abuse and Whether Retroactive Application of Civil Statutes Are Legal, 16
U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol’y 391, 425 (2012) (hereinafter “Khorram, Crossing
the Limit Line”) (citation omitted) (quoting Harvard psychiatrist Judith
Herman).
Our nation is faced with an urgent public policy crisis of the tragic
sexual abuse of children. See, e.g., Richard Wexler, WOUNDED INNOCENTS:
THE REAL VICTIMS OF THE WAR AGAINST CHILD ABUSE 79 (1995) (“The lowest
numbers one can reasonably come up with still leave . . . every year . . . more
than 100,000 sexually abused.”). While the “sexual abuse of children is a

3

tragic and increasingly common issue today . . . . even more tragic and
increasingly common is the issue of adults who suffered sexual abuse as
children and are coping with it in their adult lives.” Heidi L. Neuendorf, The
Judicial Impediment on Legislative Lawmaking in Stratmeyer v. Stratmeyer, 44
S.D. L. Rev. 115, 123 (1999).
Because many victims of child sexual abuse require decades before
they are able to “pull their lives back together and find the strength to face
what happened to them,” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-308(1)(b), many states
have enacted legislation providing a “window” of time allowing victims to
pursue claims of child sexual abuse that were previously time barred. Those
states include California,2 Delaware,3 Georgia, GA Code § 9-3-33.1(d)(1)
(2015), Hawaii, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-1.8(b), and Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 541.073. 4 (Guam has also passed such a statute, 2011 Guam Public Law 31-

Quarry v. Doe I, 272 P.3d 977, 986 (Cal. 2012) (recognizing the validity of a
statutory “window” to pursue a claim that “otherwise would be timebarred” if the Legislature provides “express language of revival”).
3 Sheehan v. Oblates of St. Francis De Sales, 15 A.3d 1247, 1258–60 (Del. 2011)
(holding the revival of intentional tort claims otherwise time barred to be
valid, “leaving any desirable changes to the General Assembly”).
4 Minnesota’s statute was subsequently amended. The version reflecting the
revival of time-barred claims can be viewed at https://www.westlaw.com/
Document/I66C7973D521548DABFD4A0CAF9C4DE3A/.
2

4

7). Utah joined that list of states because the Legislature sought “to move
into the good category nationally in how we protect children from this
heinous act of the sexual abuse of children.” 5
The Utah Legislature recognized that the short time previously
available for victims of child sexual abuse to commence a civil action was a
mistake. The previous short statute of limitations failed to provide a
reasonable time for victims to pursue justice, causing countless victims to
lose any opportunity for recourse to the courts. The single purpose of H.B.
279 is to revive that remedy, to fix the mistake of prior legislation. 6 The
principle is well recognized that retroactive legislation “might be needed if
the old law . . . has produced undesirable effects. . . . Retroactive lawmaking
provides legislators with a potentially valuable tool to attain social and
political goals.” Jan G. Laitos, Legislative Retroactivity, 52 Wash. U. J. Urb. &
Contemp. L. 81, 99 (1997) (hereinafter “Laitos, Legislative Retroactivity”).

Statement of Representative Ken Ivory during the House Floor Debate on
February 26, 2016, on House Bill 279 (Substitute 2), which can be viewed and
heard by clicking on “HB279S2” on the left column on the page found at
http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=19980&
20meta_id=622136ht. A transcript of that House Floor Debate is at Pl.’s Mem.
Opp’n, “Ex. 1,” App. “A”, ECF No. 12–4.
6 Pl. Terry Mitchell’s Br. in Supp. of an Affirmative Answer to Questions
Certified by the United States District Court (“Mitchell Brief”), at 23–24.
5

5

“Our laws are faced with the discord between finality and justice, and
the statutes of limitation seek to find that balance. However, striking a
perfect balance is impossible.” Khorram, Crossing the Limit Line, 397. Statutes
of limitations are intended to bar those who are “neglectful of their rights”
or “who fail to use reasonable and proper diligence in the enforcement
thereof,” but “[i]t is not the policy of the law to unjustly deprive one of his
remedy.” Id. at 398 (quoting Evans v. Eckelman, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605, 610 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Manguso v. Oceanside Sch. Dist., 52 Cal. Rptr. 27, 30
(Cal. Ct. App. 1979))).
In certain cases, such as with H.B. 279, the fundamental policies
underlying statutes of limitation do not apply or are counter-balanced by
principals of fairness and justice requiring that a plaintiff not be deprived of
her remedy. In contrast to the general rule that the law should provide
guidance so that the governed may conform their actions to the law, there is
no principled objection to the revival of time-barred claims where
defendants have never made choices in reliance on the statute of limitations
and where many tort victims are unable to bring timely claims due to no
fault of their own.

6

A. Revival of Time-Barred Claims Is Fair and Just Where, as
With H.B. 279, Many Tort Victims Are Unable to Assert,
or Are Intimidated Against Asserting, Their Rights.
Statutes of limitation encourage victims to promptly bring their claims.
However, equitable considerations may justify tolling or extending the
statute of limitations where some factor outside many victims’ control, such
as the pressure and intimidation by many tortfeasors, prohibits the prompt
filing of a claim. The Legislature explicitly found that “research over the last
30 years has shown that it takes decades for children and adults to pull their
lives back together and find the strength to face what happened to them[.]”
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-308(1)(b). The Legislature also recognized the
unequal balance of power between adults and children and the role many
tortfeasors, like Roberts,7 play in preventing the victim to pursue justice and

7

Mitchell described how she was pressured by Roberts to remain silent:
Defendant Roberts maintained the secrecy of his abuse by using
intimidation, deception, artifice, and the coercive, victimblaming threat to Mitchell that if anyone discovered Defendant
Roberts was engaging in sex acts with Mitchell, then a mistrial
[in the trial of Joseph Paul Franklin for the murder of Mitchell’s
two friends] would occur. That threat continued for months after
the trial, communicated repeatedly by Defendant Roberts in
telephone conversations initiated by Defendant Roberts with
Mitchell. Based on Defendant Roberts’s assertions that people
would see it as Mitchell’s fault, and because of her prior
horrendous experiences with the news media and with members
7

accountability, finding “the perpetrator is rarely a stranger and, if in a
position of authority, often brings pressure to bear on the victim to ensure
silence.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-308(1)(d).
The Legislature has taken a clear stance that Utah’s public policy is to
refrain from blaming or penalizing victims of child sexual abuse for their
frequent inability to promptly bring a civil action. It is not the children’s
fault.8 Rather, the public policy properly determined by the Utah Legislature

of the community, Mitchell believed that she would be blamed
if there were a mistrial.
Complaint (Dkt. 2), ¶ 24.
8
Statutes of limitations are “predicated on the reasonable and fair
presumption that valid claims which are of value are not usually
left to gather dust or remain dormant for long periods of time.”
In cases of childhood sexual abuse, in which resulting injury may
go unrealized for many years, this “reasonable and fair
presumption” is neither valid nor just.
Kelly v. Marcantonio, 678 A.2d 873, 885 (R.I. 1996) (Lederberg, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
[W]e must recognize that children’s access to legal recourse is
limited at best. First, the child has to recognize what is
happening is wrong. Second, the victim needs to be willing to
come forward and tell someone about the abuse before any
action can proceed, and unfortunately, many children are
ashamed and embarrassed about the sexual abuse and, thus, are
hindered from coming forward.
Khorram, Crossing the Limit Line, 407–08.
8

is that, as a matter of fairness and justice, all victims of child sex abuse must
be allowed a fair opportunity to pursue their claims.
Where, as with H.B. 279, the Legislature has found that tort victims’
inability to promptly pursue their claims is not due to “sleeping on their
rights” or a failure to use reasonable diligence in pursuing their claims and
that principles of fairness and justice weigh in favor of the revival of timebarred claims. Although Roberts expounds for five pages in the Roberts
Brief, at 10–15, about the terrific benefits of statutes of limitations, he fails to
recognize that the Utah Legislature has made the policy determination that
there shall be no statute of limitations for civil actions for child sexual abuse.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-308(3)(a). Roberts also fails in his policy arguments
to acknowledge that such a policy determination is for the Legislature, not
the courts, to make.9

Carter v. Lehi City, 269 P.3d 141, 155 (Utah 2012) (“Judicial decisions . . . are
generally focused on interpreting the policy decisions of the legislature—not
on making those decisions in the first place—and applying them to the facts
of an individual case as found by the court.”). See also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 538 (2012) (“Members of this Court are vested
with the authority to interpret the law; we possess neither the expertise nor
the prerogative to make policy judgments. Those decisions are entrusted to
our Nation's elected leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people
disagree with them.”).
9

9

B. Revival of Time-Barred Claims Is Fair and Just Where, as
With H.B. 279, Defendants Do Not Make Choices in
Reliance on the Law.
Mitchell does not contend the Legislature should arbitrarily upset
reasonable expectations of consistency and finality in the law. But those
concerns are not present with H.B. 279. No one insures against child sexual
abuse, and employers will not be found liable because the window of revival
does not apply to claims of vicarious liability.10 And, certainly, there was
nothing arbitrary whatsoever in what the Utah Legislature conscientiously
did to protect victims of child sexual abuse.
Decisions relating to child sexual abuse are quite unlike decisions
relating to contracts. Roberts, because he sexually abused Mitchell many
years ago when she was 16 years old, is put in a less advantageous position
by the retroactive effect of H.B. 279, but he has not detrimentally relied on
the law in the sense of being “deprived of anything for which he bargained
or in the expectation of which he otherwise made substantial commitments.”
W. David Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive
Lawmaking, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 216, 226 (1960). The policy of this State is not to
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See infra, at 12–13.
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permit decisions relating to the sexual abuse of a child to be made in
reasonable reliance on the limited number of years that victims, who are
frequently reticent or unable to pursue their legal claims, will have to pursue
a civil remedy.
C. The Legislature Has Decided Any Interest in a Defendant’s
Reliance on the Statute of Limitations Is Outweighed by the
Interests of Child Victims.
Roberts attempts to argue, broadly, that statutes of limitation are
important to prevent the litigation of stale claims, that it is necessary to have
limits to prevent unfair results, and that all potential claims must come to an
end. Roberts Brief at 10–14. First, those policy arguments do not help answer
the certified questions, which seek clarification regarding the power of the
Legislature and the proper analysis for construction of statutes that contain
express legislative intent to affect vested rights. More importantly, Roberts’s
extensive policy arguments about the interests served by statutes of
limitations widely miss the mark where the claim underlying the
controversy is a claim of child sexual abuse, with respect to which the Utah
Legislature has determined there should be no statute of limitations. Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-2-308(3)(a). The Legislature could not have been more clear
in articulating the policy of Utah that fairness and justice dictate that, in the
11

case of civil actions for child sexual abuse, the right of defendants to rely on
the statute of limitations is outweighed by the right of victims of child sexual
abuse to pursue their claims.
Similarly, Roberts’s arguments that defendants’ “insurers, employers,
and families” rely on the finality of statutes of limitation has no bearing on
statutes like H.B. 279. Insurance policies normally provide exclusions of
coverage for intentional torts committed by the insured and, even in the
absence of such an exclusion, strong authority provides that such coverage
would be against public policy. See, e.g., Agora Syndicate, Inc. v. Levin, 977 F.
Supp. 713, 716 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Ins.
Co., 988 N.E.2d 897, 900 (Ohio 2013); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Harbert, 741
N.W.2d 228, 238 (S.D. 2007); Padilla v. Wall Colmonoy Corp., 145 P.3d 110, 115
(N.M. 2006), as revised (Oct. 31, 2006); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club,
Inc., 549 So. 2d 1005, 1007 (Fla. 1989).
Employers will also not be liable for claims revived by H.B. 279, which
may be brought only against “a living person who . . . intentionally
perpetrated the sexual abuse [or] . . . would be criminally responsible for the
sexual abuse . . . .” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-308(6)(a), (7). In addition to the
limitation in the text of the statute, Roberts’s employer at the time of his
12

sexual abuse of Mitchell, the United States Department of Justice, does not
face any potential liability for that sexual abuse because Roberts’s abuse of
Mitchell could not be considered to be within the course of his employment.
See Shirley v. United States, 232 Fed. Appx. 419, 420 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Through
the enactment of the FTCA, the government has generally waived its
sovereign immunity from tort liability for the negligent or wrongful acts or
omissions of its agents and employees who act within the scope of their
employment ‘under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.’” (emphasis added)); Clark v.
Pangan, 2000 UT 37, ¶¶ 20–21, 998 P.2d 268 (for intentional torts in Utah to
be committed within the scope of employment: “the employee’s conduct
must (1) ‘be of the general kind the employee is employed to perform,’ (2)
‘occur within the hours of the employee’s work and the ordinary spatial
boundaries of the employment,’ and (3) ‘be motivated, at least in part, by the
purpose of serving the employer’s interest.’” (quoting Birkner v. Salt Lake
Cty., 771 P.2d 1053, 1056–57 (Utah 1989))).
Roberts’s appeal to the interest of family members of defendants
against whom claims of child sexual abuse are made is the least compelling.
13

Roberts argues that, without a statute of limitations, defendants and their
families may not be able to “organize their lives and put the past behind
them.” Roberts Brief at 11. Roberts’s argument is a perverse reversal of the
victimization addressed by H.B. 279, where the Legislature recognized that
victims of child sexual abuse “take[ ] decades to pull their lives back together
and find the strength to face what happened to them.” Utah Code Ann. §
78B-2-308(1)(b). 11
II. The Notion of Inviolable “Vested Rights” Is an Outdated
Vestige of the Nineteenth Century That Has Been Replaced
with Substantive Due Process Analysis.

Mitchell’s case is a classic example of why child sexual abuse cases often
take so long to pursue:
On November 20, 2013, hours after the execution of Franklin,
Defendant Roberts sent two emails to Mitchell from his judicial
chambers and from his United States District Court email
address after many years of no communications between them.
This event was extremely troubling and traumatizing to
Mitchell, causing her to focus on memories she had tried to keep
out of her mind because they caused so much pain, feelings of
self-blame, shame, humiliation, anger, confusion, and anguish,
triggering migraine headaches (some lasting for a few weeks),
night terrors, relationship problems, and cognitive difficulties.
Complaint (Dkt. 2), ¶ 31.
11
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In an opinion published in 1814, Justice Story addressed whether a
statute should be invalidated under the proscription against retroactive laws
in New Hampshire’s Bill of Rights, N.H. Bill of Rights, article 23
(“[R]etrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive and unjust. No such
laws, therefore, should be made, either for the decision of civil causes or the
punishment of offences.”). Justice Story penned the construction of “vested
rights” that would influence the Supreme Court for over a century:
[E]very statute, which takes away or impairs vested rights
acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation,
imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to
transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed
retrospective . . . .
Soc'y for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767
(C.C.D.N.H. 1814). However, “[b]y the middle of the Twentieth Century, the
Supreme Court had largely abandoned the strict Wheeler rule.” Laitos,
Legislative Retroactivity, 111. “Instead, the Supreme Court simply determined
whether the retroactivity was inconsistent with . .

. the Due Process,

Contracts, and Takings clauses” under a rational basis review. Id. at 111-12.
Thus, the pertinent question became “not the effect of the retroactive law on
a ‘vested right,’ . . . but whether retroactivity was a useful means of carrying
out the goal of the law.” Id. at 112. See also W. David Slawson, Constitutional
15

and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 216,
248–49 (1960) (“In treating vested-rights retroactive legislation in general . . .
the Supreme Court has commonly accorded the legislative judgment of
social need the same high degree of credence that is characteristic of all
substantive due-process adjudications . . . . [T]here seems to be little doubt
at the present time that legislation can impair or remove accrued rights of
action to the same extent that it can impair or destroy other property
rights.”).
The Wheeler rule was abandoned because it provided “an excessive
exercise of judicial power” and “both commentators and courts believed that
the term ‘vested right’ was conclusory, and not helpful in predicting whether
a law could be applied [retroactively] to an existing interest.” Laitos,
Legislative Retroactivity, 111 (citing John Scurlock, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION
AFFECTING INTERESTS IN LAND 6 (1953)).
For the same reasons, this Court should decline to revive the
anachronistic, decrepit doctrine that affecting “vested rights” is beyond the
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power of the Legislature.12 Indeed, this Court has already held, almost
uniformly, that enlarging, diminishing, or eliminating “vested rights” is well
within the Legislature’s power. See, e.g., Waddoups v. Noorda, 2013 UT 64, ¶
8, 321 P.3d 1108 (“Laws that ‘enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or

Roberts argues that decisions in five other states support the view that
“vested rights” protect against legislative revival of time-barred claims,
Roberts Brief at 29–30, n.17, but misleadingly fails to note the following:
(1) Green v. Karol, 344 N.E.2d 106, 112 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976), addressed a
statute that had no expression of intent that the statute had retroactive effect.
Instead, the court dealt merely with an amended statute of limitations that
provided a longer time. Id. (The “statute of limitation was amended as
follows: ‘Action under this section shall be commenced within two . . . years
after discovery by the person bringing the action of a violation of this act . . .
and not afterwards. . . .’” (quoting Ch. 190, s 3, (1969) Ind. Acts 541 (amended
1975))).
(2) Johnson v. Gans Furniture Indus., Inc., 114 S.W.3d 850, 855 (Ky. 2003),
determined the statute at issue did not impair a vested right.
(3) Angell v. Hallee, 92 A.3d 1154, 1157 (Me. 2014), addressed the simple
lengthening of the time to bring an action, without any expression of
legislative intent that the statute was to be applied retroactively or was to
revive time-barred claims.
(4) Overmiller v. D.E. Horn & Co., 191 Pa. Super. 562, 572 (1960), merely noted,
equivocally, that “had the legislature made any such attempt [to revive
claims that had been barred] there is authority to indicate that it would be
unconstitutional.” That statement was based on Stewart v. Keyes, 295 U.S. 403,
417 (1935), a case dealing with whether the lifting of the bar of a statute of
limitations in “an attempt arbitrarily to take [real or personal] property from
one having a perfect title and to subject it to an extinguished claim of
another” would be “to deprive him of his property without due process of
law” (emphasis added).

12
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contractual rights’ are substantive and are barred from retroactive effect
absent express legislative intent.” (emphasis added)); Roark v. Crabtree, 893 P.2d
1058, 1061 (Utah 1995) (“‘It is a longstanding rule of statutory construction
that a legislative enactment which alters the substantive law or affects vested
rights will not be read to operate retrospectively unless the legislature has
clearly expressed that intention.’” (quoting Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253
(Utah 1988)) (emphasis added)); Ireland v. Mackintosh, 61 P. 901, 904 (Utah
1900) (Statutes “will not be permitted to affect past transactions, unless such
intention is clearly and unequivocally expressed; . . . .”).
III. The Notion of Inviolable “Vested Rights” Is Entirely
Inconsistent With the Longstanding Rule in Utah Law That the
Legislature May Enlarge, Diminish, or Eliminate “Vested
Rights” Where, as in H.B. 279, the Legislature Clearly
Expresses Such Intent.
Contrary to Roberts’s arguments, there is not one Utah case, other than
the aberrational State v. Apotex, 2012 UT 36, 282 P.3d 66, holding that, even
where a “vested right” is enlarged, diminished, or eliminated, the courts
may disregard an expressed legislative intention that a statute is to be
applied retroactively.13 The inescapable fact is that nearly all relevant Utah

Roberts cites to only two cases in which he maintains the Utah Legislature
stated its intent to revive a plaintiff’s time-barred claim and the courts
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cases for over 115 years have held that a clear expression of legislative intent
regarding retroactivity must control.
Ignoring more than 115 years of Utah case law affirming the power of
the Utah Legislature to enlarge, diminish, or eliminate “substantive” or
“vested” rights by retroactive legislation when the Legislature clearly

disregarded that intent. In Hyland v. Dixie State Univ., the court noted that
“Utah law codifies the presumption that ‘[a] provision of the Utah Code is
not retroactive, unless the provision is expressly declared to be retroactive.’” 2:15–
CV–36 TS, 2017 WL 2123839, at *2 (D. Utah May 16, 2017) (unpublished)
(emphasis added). According to Roberts, in Hyland, “[t]he Utah Legislature
could not have been clearer in stating its intent to revive plaintiff’s
claim . . . .” Roberts Brief at 36. That flies directly in the face of the court’s
finding in Hyland that “[h]ere, there is no expression of retroactivity in the
amendment, so retroactivity depends on whether the amended portions are
procedural or substantive, and whether they enlarge or eliminate vested
rights.” Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
Apotex is the only other case to which Roberts points, Roberts Brief at 35, for
the notion that courts can disregard an expressed legislative intent that a
statute is to be applied retroactively. There, this Court described the lower
court’s conclusion, noting that “the amendments expanded the limitations
period and expressly provided for the new limitations period to be
retroactive.” 2012 UT 36, ¶ 14. However, there was no discussion in Apotex
about the power of a court to disregard an expressed intention of the
Legislature concerning how a statute is to be applied or of any notion of
judicial review that would permit such a disregard of a legislative
enactment, particularly with no constitutional analysis.
The fact remains that Roberts cannot point to one Utah case, other than
Apotex, in which a court found there to be a clear expression of legislative
intent that a statute was to be applied retroactively and that such intent was
to be disregarded by the courts.
19

expresses its intention that the legislation is to be applied retroactively,
Roberts boldly—and erroneously—asserts that this Court has consistently
recognized that “the Utah Legislature lacks that power.” 14 Roberts reaches
that erroneous conclusion by cherry-picking phrases from cases that actually
affirm the power of the Legislature to enact retroactive legislation affecting
“vested” rights and by relying on inapposite cases that did not involve any
judicial finding of express legislative intent that a statute was to be applied
retroactively. A holding, like that sought by Roberts, stating the Utah
Legislature is absolutely prohibited from enacting retroactive legislation
affecting “vested rights,” regardless of the clear expression of the
Legislature’s intent, would be a wholesale betrayal of the principle of stare
decisis and a radical repudiation of modern due process analysis and the
principle of separation of power between the judicial and legislative
branches.
Roberts maintains there has been no conflict in the law regarding the
issues before this Court. 15 The United States District Court (“Federal Court”),

Roberts Brief, at 1.
15Id. at 1, 3, 5, 9 28, 42.
14
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of course, saw it very differently, leading it to certify two questions of Utah
law to this Court. 16
In this matter the Federal Court was called upon to determine whether
the Utah Legislature, which clearly expressed its intention that the statute is
to be applied retroactively, has the ability to make governmental policy
determinations and enact a statute, Utah Code section 78B–2–308(7), to
revive claims of child sexual abuse that were barred, as of July 1, 2016, by a
prior statute of limitations.17 The Federal Court, bound to apply Utah law,
found itself in a quandary in light of (1) the aberrational case State v. Apotex
Corp., 2012 UT 36, 282 P.3d 66, which, although not addressing the intent of
the Legislature, purports to express an absolute prohibition against the
revival of time-barred claims simply because a “vested right” is eliminated18

Memorandum Decision and Order to Submit Proposed Question for
Certification (“Memorandum Decision”) (Dkt. 29); Order of Certification to
Utah Supreme Court (Dkt. 37).
17 Memorandum Decision.
18 This Court stated in Apotex: “The amended UFCA [Utah False Claims Act]
cannot resurrect claims that have already expired under the one-year
limitations period.” 2012 UT 36, ¶ 67, 282 P.3d 66, citing Roark v. Crabtree 893
P.2d 1058, 1062 (Utah 1995), which quoted 51 AMJUR 2d Limitation of Actions
§ 44 (1970). The Court apparently found that since “the defense of an expired
statute of limitations is a vested right,” id., that was the end of the analysis,
without even discussing the primary test of legislative intent.
16
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and (2) this Court’s several opinions before Apotex 19 and after Apotex,20 which
all held that the applicable two-part test, to be applied in determining if a
statute is to be applied retroactively, is (1) if the Legislature has clearly
expressed an intention that substantive law or “vested rights” are to be
altered retroactively by a statute, then the statute is to be so applied, and (2)
if there has been no expression of legislative intent that a statute is to be
applied retroactively, it is to be applied retroactively only if the statute is
procedural and does not enlarge or eliminate “vested rights.” 21
A. Several Utah Cases Affirm the Utah Legislature’s
Authority to Revive Previously Time-Barred Claims
When It Expresses Its Intent That a Revival Statute Be
Applied Retroactively.
The Hawaii Supreme Court perfectly captured the dynamic in Utah’s
case law relating to retroactive application of statutes, particularly the
revival by statutes of previously time-barred claims: “Although courts often
repeat the rule that ‘subsequent extensions of a statutory limitation period

Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1998); Evans & Sutherland Computer
Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 1997); Roark v. Crabtree,
893 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1995).
20 Waddoups v. Noorda, 2013 UT 64, 321 P.3d 1108.
21 See the statement describing the source of the Federal Court’s confusion in
Mitchell Brief, at 12–13; Memorandum Decision, at 2–3.
19
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will not revive a claim previously barred’, the question remains one of
legislative intent.” Roe v. Doe, 581 P.2d 310, 316 (Haw. 1978).
One hundred seventeen years ago, this Court, in Ireland v. Mackintosh,
described as a “vested right” a defense under a previous statute of
limitations in a case involving the attempted collection under a promissory
note. 61 P. 901, 904 (Utah 1900). Yet this Court, faced with a question about
a possible statutory revival of the previously time-barred claim, stated: “It is
a rule of construction that statutes ‘are to be so construed as to have a
prospective effect, merely, and will not be permitted to affect past
transactions, unless such intention is clearly and unequivocally expressed . . . .’”
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Potter v. Ajax Min. Co., 57 P. 270, 273 (1899)
(holding that an attorney’s lien statute was not to be retroactively applied
because such intention was not expressed by the legislature in the act)).
The determining factor in Ireland as to whether a time-barred claim had
been revived was that “[t]he amendatory act of March 20, 1897, neither by
its expressed terms nor by intendment shows that the legislature intended
to revive causes of action which had before the passage of that act become
barred.” 61 P. at 904. In Ireland, this Court applied the very two-part test

23

constituting the historical Utah rules,22 as described by the Federal Court in
this case: First, did the Legislature express its intention that the statute be
applied retroactively to revive time-barred claims? If not, is the right
“vested”?
If the Legislature has not expressed its intention the right is to be
altered by retroactive application of a statute, and if the right is “vested,”
then, and only then, retroactive application of the statute is prohibited.
Conversely, even if a “vested right” would be affected, if the Legislature
expressed its intent a statute is to be applied retroactively and a previously
time-barred claim revived, then the courts are to apply the statute
retroactively.
We are clearly of the opinion–First, that it was not the intention
of the legislature to revive causes of action on claims which had
previously become stale, and against which the statute had fully
run; and, second, that, when appellant’s right of action on the
note in question became barred under the previous statute, the
respondent acquired a vested right, in this state, to plead that
statute as a defense and bar to the action.
Id. (Emphasis added.)

22

Memorandum Decision, at 2.
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This Court did not say that a “vested right” was somehow untouchable
and not subject to alteration by the Legislature, even where the Legislature
expressed its intention that a statute would affect that right. The holding of
Ireland is that since it was a “vested right,” it was not affected by retroactive
application of a statute because the Legislature did not intend to revive a timebarred claim by retroactive application of the new statute. Id. 23
In Roark v. Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1995), this Court considered
whether a new statute allowing the filing of a civil action for child sexual
abuse within four years after discovery of the abuse could be applied
retroactively to revive previously time-barred claims. The two-part test
applied in Roark—which is the same test applied nearly uniformly in Utah
cases addressing whether to apply any statute retroactively—was, first, to
inquire as to the potentially dispositive issue of “legislative intent”
regarding retroactive application of the new statute, then, second, only after

Two cases cited by Roberts for the notion that a statute increasing the
period of limitation cannot revive a previously time-barred claim are In re
Swan’s Estate, 79 P.2d 999, 1002 (Utah 1938), and Greenhalgh v. Payson City,
530 P.2d 799, 802 (Utah 1975). Both of those cases rely on Ireland, which,
again, recognized that the expression of legislative intent is dispositive as to
the question of whether a statute revives time-barred claims. Also, neither of
those cases dealt with an expression by the Utah Legislature of its intention
that previously time-barred claims should be revived.
23
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finding there was no legislative intent to apply the new statute retroactively, to
analyze whether the new statute was “procedural” or whether it “enlarges,
eliminates, or destroys vested or contractual rights.” Id. 1061–62.
Even the structure of the Roark opinion makes clear the primary test of
legislative intent and the secondary test to be applied if there is no
expression of legislative intent. The first section of the discussion under the
heading “RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF SECTION 78–12–25.1” is
entitled “Legislative Intent”. Id. at 1061. There this Court stated the primary
rule as follows:
“It is a long-standing rule of statutory construction that a
legislative enactment which alters the substantive law or affects
vested rights will not be read to operate retrospectively unless the
legislature has clearly expressed that intention.” Madsen v. Borthick,
769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 1988) (citing Schultz v. Conger 755 P.2d
165, 166 (Utah 1988); Stephens v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952, 953–54
(Utah 1987); Pilcher v. State, 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983); State v.
Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982); Union Pac. R.R. v. Trustees,
Inc., 8 Utah 2d 101, 104, 329 P.2d 398, 399 (1958); McCarrey v. Utah
State Teachers’ Retirement Bd., 111 Utah 251, 253, 177 P.2d 725, 226
(1947); In re Ingraham’s Estate, 106 Utah 337, 339, 148 P.2d 340,
341–42 (1944); Farrel v. Pingree, 5 Utah 443, 448, 16 P. 843, 845
(1888)). This rule of construction is codified in Utah Code Ann. §
68–3–3.
Id. (emphasis added). This Court then determined that the Legislature did
not intend the statute would be applied retroactively. Id. at 1061–62.
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After finding there was no legislative intent that the statute should be
applied retroactively, the Court then proceeded to determine whether the
statute “changes only procedural law” (under which circumstances the
statute would be applied retroactively, regardless of legislative intent) or
whether the “statute enlarges, eliminates, or destroys vested or contractual
rights.” Id. at 1062. The Court then held that reliance on the running of a
statute of limitations is a “vested right”—the very label given to the category
of rights that can be affected by a legislative enactment when, under the
primary test of “legislative intent,” “the legislature has clearly expressed
[the] intention” that a statute “be read to operate retrospectively.” Id. at 1061.
Roark makes clear that the question as to whether a statute affects “vested
rights” is relevant only if there is no legislative intent that a statute is to be
applied retroactively.
This Court applied the same test in State v. Lusk, 2001 UT 102, 37 P.3d
1103, without noting the possible ex post facto implications in criminal cases.
In Lusk, this Court considered whether a longer statute of limitations revived
a previously time-barred criminal charge of aggravated sexual abuse of a
child. Id. ¶ 25. Immediately following the statements in Lusk relied upon by
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Roberts,24 the following crucial paragraph, wholly ignored by Roberts, was
emphasized by this Court:
“It is a long-standing rule of statutory construction that a
legislative enactment which alters the substantive law or affects
vested rights will not be read to operate retrospectively unless the
legislature has clearly expressed that intention. Madsen v. Borthick,
769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 1988); accord Evans & Sutherland Computer
Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 953 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1997); Roark v.
Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1995). Nevertheless, where
such specific legislative is absent, a statute may be applied
retroactively if it is procedural in nature and does not enlarge or
eliminate vested rights. Evans & Sutherland, 953 P.2d at 437–38;
see also Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Indus. Comm’n, 947 P.2d 671,
675 (Utah 1997); State ex rel. Kirby v. Jacoby, 1999 UT App 52, ¶ 10,
975 P.2d 939.
Id. ¶ 27 (emphasis added).
The only meaning that can be attributed to that paragraph is that,
absent express legislative intent that a statute is to be applied retroactively,
it will still be applied retroactively if “it is procedural in nature and does not
enlarge or eliminate vested rights.” Further, if there is a statement of
legislative intent that the statute is to be applied retroactively, it shall be
given that application even if it “alters the substantive law or affects vested
rights.” Id. See also Lucero v. State, 2016 UT App 50, ¶ 10, 369 P.3d 469.

24

Roberts Brief, at 21.
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B.

When the Utah Legislature Clearly Expresses Its Intent
That a Statute Be Applied Retroactively, Utah Law
Uniformly Calls for the Retroactive Application, Even
Where Substantive or Vested Rights May Be Enlarged,
Diminished, or Eliminated.

One hundred eighteen years ago, this Court stated in Potter v. Ajax
Min. Co., 57 P. at 273 (1899), that, in determining whether a statute is to be
applied retroactively, the intent of the Legislature is the determinative factor,
under both the common law and the statutory law:
At common law the rule was that a statute is never to be
construed to operate retrospectively, unless such intention is
clearly expressed in the act. Section 2490, Rev. St., expressly
provides that no part of the Revised Statutes is retroactive, unless
expressly so declared.
57 P. at 273 (emphasis added).
Although this Court has, at times, expressed that vested rights
cannot be affected by retroactive application of legislation, the primacy
of legislative intent in determining whether a statute affecting
“substantive” or “vested” rights has been consistently recognized by
Utah courts considering the effect of legislative intent ever since Potter.
See Mitchell Brief, at 7–10, 13–21. The same rule has been applied by
the United States Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Id. at 15–16.
29

IV. The Constitution Is the Only Authority Upon Which This
Court May Limit the Power of the Legislature, and Where the
Legislature Has Unambiguously Expressed Its Intent, as in
H.B. 279, the Role of the Courts Is to Apply Statutes as Written.
The legislative power of the State is vested in the Senate and the House
of Representatives, and no person charged with the exercise of judicial
power “shall exercise any functions appertaining” to the legislative power.
Utah Const. art. 6, § 1; Utah Const. art. V, § 1 (separating powers and noting
exception for “cases herein expressly directed or permitted,” none of which
apply to the Certified Question). Accordingly, absent constitutional
infirmity, “[u]nambiguous language in the statute may not be interpreted to
contradict its plain meaning.” Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah
1989) (citing Johnson v. State Retirement Board, 770 P.2d 93 (Utah 1988)); State
ex rel. M.E.P., 2005 UT App 227, ¶ 11, 114 P.3d 596, 599 (“Indeed, Defendant's
argument essentially asks this court to take on the role of the legislature and
insert the term ‘overly’ into the statute. We cannot do this.”).
[A] legislative act will not be stricken unless the interests of
justice require the same because the law is clearly in conflict with
that set forth in the constitution.
State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989) (citing Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d
78, 80 (Utah 1981)). See also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519,
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538 (2012) (“’Proper respect for a coordinate branch of the government’
requires that we strike down an Act of Congress only if ‘the lack of
constitutional authority to pass [the] act in question is clearly
demonstrated.’” (quoting United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883))).
Here, Roberts, seeks to cast the proposition that “expired civil claims
cannot be revived by legislation” as a “settled, black letter rule.” Roberts
Brief at 5. Not only does Utah law stand for exactly the opposite position,
but there can be no judicially-created per se, super-judicial-review “black
letter rule,” providing as sacrosanct and untouchable the “vesting” of a
defense of a statute of limitations, bestowing upon the judiciary the power
to disregard legislatively expressed policy and statutory law. Hence, where
the Utah Legislature clearly expresses its intention, the answer to the
certified questions before this Court is yes, the Legislature can indeed revive
time-barred claims when it clearly expresses its intent to do so.
V. No Constitutional Provision Prevents the Legislature From
Reviving Time-Barred Civil Claims Where the Legislature
Expresses Its Intention and the Revival Is Rationally Related
to Addressing the Clear Evil of Unredressed Child Sexual
Abuse.
“Nothing in the United States or Utah Constitution prohibits
retroactive legislation except as to ex post facto laws.” Salt Lake City v. Tax
31

Comm'n of State of Utah ex rel. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Corp., 813 P.2d 1174,
1177 (Utah 1991). “The protection against ex post facto laws applies only to
criminal punishment, not civil remedies.” In re Discipline of Ennenga, 2001 UT
111, ¶ 18, 37 P.3d 1150. 25 Because Utah has no constitutional prohibition
against retroactive legislation, the Legislature may even impose retroactive
taxes that burden completed transactions. Garrett Freight Lines v. State Tax
Comm'n, 135 P.2d 523, 526–27 (Utah 1943).
Even where some state constitutions, unlike Utah’s Constitution,
expressly forbid retroactive legislation, courts may still apply a balancing
test to determine whether a retroactive statute is constitutional. See e.g.,
Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 335 S.W.3d 126, 145 (Tex. 2010) (“[I]n
determining whether a statute violates the prohibition against retroactive
laws in article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution [“No . . . retroactive law
. . . shall be made”], courts must consider three factors in light of the
prohibition's dual objectives: the nature and strength of the public interest

Roberts resorts to several inapposite criminal cases, involving ex post facto
issues, in support of his notion that the Legislature cannot revive previously
time barred claims. Roberts Brief at 14, 20–23, 25, 35, 42 (citing State v. Lusk,
2001 UT 102, 37 P.3d 1103), 26–27 (citing State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577 (Utah
1983)), 41 (citing State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1983).
25
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served by the statute as evidenced by the Legislature's factual findings; the
nature of the prior right impaired by the statute; and the extent of the
impairment.”).
Without engaging in any due process or open courts analysis, Roberts
argues that a “vested” right of an expired statute of limitations cannot be
taken away by legislation, as if that right is in its own category of being
uniquely, absolutely, per se “protected” by the Open Courts Clause and by
the Due Process Clause. However, the Legislature has the power to enlarge,
diminish, or eliminate many rights implicated by either or both clauses. The
analysis is uniformly not whether, as an absolute matter, the Legislature can
do so, but whether the subject legislation satisfies the applicable
constitutional test—a test never even addressed by Roberts. 26 Roberts has
utterly failed to address or suggest any constitutional analysis.
To undergo any constitutional analysis would concede that,
responsive to the first Certified Question, yes, the legislature can, at least in
some circumstances (including those at issue here), revive time-barred

In fact, until Roberts’s initial Brief in this matter, he never raised any
constitutional issue in this matter. See Mitchell Brief at 26 and n.18; Plaintiff’s
Memorandum in Opposition to the Framing by Defendant of the Proposed
Question to Be Certified to the Utah Supreme Court (Dkt. 36), at 3–6.
26

33

claims. Not only is revival generally within the power of the legislature, H.B.
279, specifically, survives scrutiny under both the Due Process Clause and
the Open Courts Clause.27
A. The Due Process Clause Allows the Legislature to
Diminish or Destroy Vested Rights Where, as in H.B. 279,
a Rational Basis Supports a Legitimate Legislative
Objective.
Roberts argues, as if it were a per se rule that escapes scrutiny under
well-established constitutional analysis, that “[u]nder Utah law, the right to
be free, forever, from claims that have expired is a constitutional due process
right that cannot be taken away by legislation.” Roberts Brief at 31. While
Utah case law—which basically parrots “vested rights” language, the
genesis of which is from pre-modern-due-process-analysis Nineteenth
Century cases—provides that a defendant acquires a “vested right” upon
the expiration of the time in which to file a claim, Roark v. Crabtree, 893 P.2d
1058, 1062 (Utah 1995), that is merely the starting point of a due process

Roberts does not argue that any other constitutional provision supports
his claim. It bears noting that Utah’s Constitution does not contain a
prohibition against retroactive legislation. Compare Utah Const. art. I § 17
(“No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed.”) with, e.g., Tex. Const. art. I, § 16 (“No bill of
attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law, or any law impairing the
obligation of contracts, shall be made.”).
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analysis. It is certainly not the end or the entirety of the analysis, as Roberts
maintains (and as this Court in Apotex 28 seems to imply). If the determination
that a substantial or vested right were at issue were the end of the analysis,
that would mean the right of a man who has engaged in child sexual abuse
to plead a statute of limitations defense would be even more essential and
primary than what this Court has found to entail fundamental rights, 29 which
the legislature may impair if there is a compelling state interest and the
means are narrowly tailored to achieving that interest. Jensen ex rel. Jensen v.
Cunningham, 2011 UT 17, ¶ 72, 250 P.3d 465, 484 (“A statute that infringes
upon [a] ‘fundamental’ right is subject to heightened scrutiny and is
unconstitutional unless it (1) furthers a compelling state interest and (2) ‘the
means adopted are narrowly tailored to achieve the basic statutory
purpose.’” (quoting Wells v. Children's Aid Soc'y of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 206
(Utah 1984)).
If the right to plead the defense of the running of a statute of limitations
is found to be implicated by the Due Process Clause, then a legislative

State v. Apotex Corp., 2012 UT 36, ¶ 67, 282 P.3d 66.
29 For example, this Court has recognized as “fundamental” rights the “right
of privacy” and “the right to travel,” In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah
1981); and parental rights, In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982).
28
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infringement of that right would be subject to either the rational basis test or
heightened scrutiny, depending on whether the right is characterized as
“fundamental.” Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, ¶ 30, 103 P.3d 135, 143. Roberts
does not characterize the right “to be free from expired claims” as
fundamental.30 And the right to rely on a statute of limitations defense
against claims of child sexual abuse cannot be a fundamental right. See In re
Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51, ¶ 39, 358 P.3d 1009, 1020 (noting that
recognizing a “fundamental right” requires first showing such a right is
“‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ and in the ‘history
and culture of Western civilization.’” (quoting In re J.P., 684 P.2d 1364, 1375
(Utah 1982)). It is therefore within the power of the Legislature to revive
time-barred claims so long as the statute “is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest.” Gardner v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 2008 UT 6, ¶ 33, 178 P.3d 893.

Roberts characterizes the right to be free from time-barred claims as being
protected by the Open Courts Clause. Roberts Brief at 31–33. “[A]rticle I,
section 11 rights are not properly characterized as ‘fundamental,’ . . . .” Judd
v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, ¶ 30, 103 P.3d 135, 143.
30
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No Utah case has analyzed a statute that expressly revives time-barred
claims under the Due Process Clause,31 but other state courts have applied a
version of the rational basis test:
The due process clauses of Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution protect individuals from being deprived of
property without due process of law. We have adopted a twopart test to determine whether retroactive statutes comport with
due process.
We first determine whether application of the statutes in
question to the party challenging the statute actually has a
retroactive effect. This inquiry turns on whether the challenging
party has a “vested” right. “‘The concept of vested rights is
conclusory—a right is vested when it has been so far perfected
that it cannot be taken away by statute.’”
However, merely “identifying a substantive, or vested, property
right is not dispositive for due process purposes.” After a vested
property right has been identified, we employ the balancing test
set forth in Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis.2d 156, 531 N.W.2d 70
(1995), which “examines whether the retroactive statute has a
rational basis.”

Although Roark addressed an argument that the “right to plead a defense
of statute of limitations is a vested right which cannot be impaired without
denying him due process of law,” the Court found no legislative intent that
the statute be applied retroactively and, further, did not ground any of its
analysis in the Due Process Clause. 893 P.2d at 1061–62. In Apotex, this Court
interpreted a statute as having no retroactive effect as a matter of statutory
interpretation and court-made black letter law, citing to Roark and American
Jurisprudence, 2d. It engaged in no constitutional analysis. 2012 UT 36, ¶ 67,
282 P.3d 66.
31
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Soc'y Ins. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 786 N.W.2d 385, 395–97 (Wis.
2010) (footnotes and citations omitted) (alteration in original). See also In re
Individual 35W Bridge Litig., 806 N.W.2d 820, 832 (Minn. 2011) (“When the
retroactive application of a statute is supported by a legitimate legislative
purpose furthered by rational means, the statute does not violate due
process.”). See also Gallewski v. H. Hentz & Co., 93 N.E.2d 620, 624 (N.Y. 1950)
(“[T]he Legislature may constitutionally revive a personal cause of action
where the circumstances are exceptional and are such as to satisfy the court
that serious injustice would result to plaintiffs not guilty of any fault if the
intention of the Legislature were not effectuated.”).
Roberts misleadingly argues that “[s]even states hold their state
constitution’s due process clause—sometimes in conjunction with a vested
rights analysis—prohibits retroactive revival of time barred claims.”32

Roberts, misleadingly, fails to note the following:
(1) Doe v. Crooks, 613 S.E.2d 536 (S.C. 2005) addressed a change in a statute
of limitations with no indication that the legislature intended to revive timebarred claims.
(2) State of Minn. ex rel. Hove v. Doese, 501 N.W.2d 366, 368 (S.D. 1993)
addressed an amended statute that had no “plain intention of retroactivity.”
(3) Colony Hill Condo. I Assoc. v. Colony Co., 320 S.E.2d 273, 276 (N.C. Ct. App.
1984) addressed a statute that had no legislative intent for revival or
retroactive application and was a statute of repose, not a statute of limitations,
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Roberts Brief at 30. None of the cases cited by Roberts, however, analyze
anything analogous to H.B. 279, which contains legislative findings that
show the gravity of the problem the legislature sought to address and the
necessity of revival of time-barred claims. Instead, each of the cases cited by
Roberts support a proposition with which Mitchell agrees: The Legislature
may not arbitrarily eliminate rights protected by constitutional due process.
Roark’s dicta quoted American Jurisprudence, 2d, to say—in absolute
terms—that the defense that a claim is time barred “cannot be taken away
by legislation.” Roark v. Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1063 (Utah 1995). Long
before that, this Court maintained a more nuanced view and, consistent with

and stated “[a] statute of repose, unlike an ordinary statute of limitations,
defines substantive rights to bring an action.”
(4) Kelly v. Marcantonio, 678 A.2d 873, 881–82 (R.I. 1996) addressed an
amended statute that unlike H.B. 279, did not have a clear expression of
legislative intent that the statute would have retroactive effect and did not
have compelling legislative findings to show why that retroactive effect is
necessary.
(5) Doe v. Diocese of Dallas, 917 N.E.2d 475, 480 (Ill. 2009) and (6) Givens v.
Anchor Packing, Inc. 466 N.W.2d 771 (Neb. 1991) did not address statutes with
legislative findings like that in H.B. 279.
(7) Wiley v. Roof, 641 So. 2d 66, 67 (Fla. 1994), addressed a statute that, unlike
H.B. 279, had no legislative findings and, indicating the legislature cannot
arbitrarily resurrect claims, stated “the legislature cannot subsequently
declare that ‘we change our mind on this type of claim’ and then resurrect
it.”
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Justice Bradley’s dissent in Cambell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 631–34 (1885),
recognized that “due process concepts” mandated that the legislature may
not arbitrarily eliminate a vested right to a claim or defense. See Buttrey v.
Guaranteed Sec. Co., 78 Utah 39, 300 P. 1040, 1045 (1931) (In discussing an
accrued cause of action that was argued to be destroyed by the repeal of
statute, the Court stated, “It is a vested right, in the nature of a property right,
and ought to be regarded as property in the sense that tangible things are
property and equally protected by the Constitution against arbitrary
interference by the Legislature.” (emphasis added) (citing Hailing v.
Industrial Commission, 71 Utah 112, 263 P. 78, 81 (1931) (“A vested right of
action is property in the same sense in which tangible things are property,
and is equally protected against arbitrary interference.” (emphasis added)
(quoting 2 Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.) p. 756))).
The analyses in Ireland, 61 P. at 904, and Roark v. Crabtree, 893 P.2d at
1062–63, also demonstrate the underlying applicable principle is that vested
rights cannot be arbitrarily taken away by an act of legislation. In Ireland, this
Court held it would not construe a statute to “affect past transactions, unless
such intention is clearly and unequivocally expressed.” 61 P. 901 at 904.
Specifically, in the absence of legislative intent to revive time-barred claims,
40

a statute would not be construed to deprive a defendant of the vested right
to plead that the action was untimely. Id. The rule in Ireland does not restrict
the power of the Legislature, but recognizes that construing a statute to
deprive a vested right would be impermissible in the absence of a statement of
legislative intent. Similarly, in Roark, as noted supra, at 25–27, this Court first
looked to whether the Legislature expressed an intention to revive timebarred claims, then held that in the absence of a clear expression of legislative
intent the statute could not be construed to diminish the defendant’s
“vested” defense that the claim was time barred. 893 P.2d at 1062, 1063.
The revival of time-barred claims is not in a special category all its
own, where it is absolutely forbidden regardless of the Legislature’s policies
and expressed intention and immune from the application of wellestablished constitutional analyses. The Due Process Clause does not, as
Roberts asserts, provide a per se, absolute bar restricting the revival of timebarred claims. Rather, it merely requires that the Legislature act according
to due process in reviving previously time-barred claims—i.e. where the
revival is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
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1. H.B. 279 Passes Scrutiny Under the Due Process
Clause Because It Is Rationally Related to the
Legitimate State Interest of Allowing Victims of
Child Sexual Abuse to Seek Justice.
H.B. 279 has the purpose of allowing victims of child sexual abuse to
seek redress in the courts and to provide society the concomitant social and
economic benefits. Numerous courts have found the revival of time-barred
claims to pass constitutional muster, some without nearly as compelling
governmental interests or the detailed expression of legislative intent as that
presented in H.B. 279. See Mitchell Brief, at 27–29 (collecting fourteen
decisions finding revival of time-barred claims constitutional).
Other courts have addressed statutes substantially similar to H.B. 279
and found no constitutional violation. In Connecticut, a statute reviving
expired claims for child sexual abuse was found to have a legitimate purpose
and accomplished that purpose in a reasonable way, as follows:
[P]laintiff emphasizes the “legitimate legislative purpose” of [the
revival statute] . . . . namely, “to afford a plaintiff sufficient time
to recall and come to terms with traumatic childhood events
before he or she must take action,” with a defendant being “now
unexpectedly exposed to liability . . . an express purpose of the
statute.” Indeed, Senator Anthony Avallone, reflected on
“‘substantial testimony before the [Judiciary] Committee that
minor victims of sexual assault often do not understand or
recognize the damage which they have sustained until a
substantial number of years after they attain majority. In fact, it
42

is not just two or three years, but can be substantially longer than
that. . . . So the [Judiciary] Committee in recognition of that
extends the statute of limitations on which one can bring an
action.’”
*
*
*
Given the unique psychological and social factors that often
result in delayed reporting of childhood sexual abuse, which
frustrated the ability of victims to bring an action under earlier
revisions of the statute of limitations, we cannot say that the
legislature acted unreasonably or irrationally in determining
that the revival of child sexual abuse victims' previously time
barred claims serves a legitimate public interest and
accomplishes that purpose in a reasonable way.
Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 514, 517 (Conn.
2015).
A similar statute in Massachusetts was subject to constitutional
scrutiny, and the “compelling legislative purpose” was found to outweigh
defendants’ rights, including the effect on their ability to present evidence:
That being said, in reviewing Previte's challenge to the
retroactive operation of the act, it nonetheless is necessary to
return to the essential requirement that a retroactive statute's
burden must be “reasonable in scope and extent.” “Only those
statutes which, on a balancing of opposing considerations, are
deemed to be unreasonable, are held to be unconstitutional.”
Among the factors we weigh in assessing reasonableness are the
duration of the burden imposed by the retroactive statute and
“whether the scope of the statute is narrowly drawn to treat the
problem perceived by the legislature.”
Here, there is no question that the limitations period has been
very substantially expanded; although the enlargement is not of
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“infinite duration,” thirty-five years is unquestionably a great
deal longer than three. The extensive expansion of the statute of
limitations undoubtedly affects a defendant's (and similarly a
plaintiff's) ability to present evidence. On the other hand, the
extent of the expansion appears to be tied directly to the
compelling legislative purpose underlying the act, and in
particular, the apparent recognition that in many cases, victims
of child abuse are not able to appreciate the extent or the cause
of harm they experience as a result of sexual abuse perpetrated
on them for many years after the abuse has ended.
Sliney v. Previte, 41 N.E.3d 732, 741–42 (Mass. 2015) (footnotes and citations
omitted).
Here, the Utah Legislature has demonstrated a profound and
legitimate—in fact, compelling—governmental interest in the revival of timebarred claims for child sexual abuse, as stated in the text of the statute:
The Legislature finds that:
(a) child sexual abuse is a crime that hurts the most
vulnerable in our society and destroys lives;
(b) research over the last 30 years has shown that it takes
decades for children and adults to pull their lives back
together and face what happened to them;
(c) often the abuse is compounded by the fact that the
perpetrator is a member of the victim’s family and when
such abuse comes out, the victim is further stymied by
the family’s wish to avoid public embarrassment;
(d) even when the abuse is not committed by a family
member, the perpetrator is rarely a stranger and, if in a
position of authority, often brings pressure to bear on
the victim to ensure silence; . . . .
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Utah Code § 78B-2-308(1). That legitimate, compelling interest is further
expounded upon in the legislative history. 33
The Utah Legislature described how it unwittingly had made a
grievous mistake in previously limiting the time to bring claims of child
sexual abuse to a narrow length of time, within which victims were unable
to face the consequences of their abuse and file claims against their abusers.
The courts are without the authority to deprive the Legislature of the power
to fix its prior mistakes or misunderstandings and revive time-barred claims,
particularly where the Legislature has demonstrated a legitimate, and even
compelling, state interest rationally advanced by the legislative means it has
chosen.
B.

The Open Courts Clause Does Not Prevent the
Legislature From Reviving Time-Barred Claims Because
(1) A “Vested” Defense in the Running of the Statute of
Limitations Is Not Protected by the Open Courts Clause
and (2) Even If It Were, the Legislature May Abrogate
that Defense Where There Is a Clear Social or Economic
Evil to Be Eliminated and Abrogation of the Defense Is
Rationally Related to that Objective.

The Open Courts Clause protects remedies that existed at common law
and access to the courts for all parties to present their claims and defenses.

33

Mitchell Brief, at 23–24 and nn.12–13.
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Nowhere does the Open Court Clause provide a constitutional protection
for defenses to claims. For good reason, this Court has never held that a right
to plead a defense, let alone a legislatively created right to plead a statute of
limitations defense, is protected by the Open Courts Clause.
Even if the Open Courts Clause were to be expanded beyond its
express terms to preserve a defense that a claim is time barred, that would
not mean, as Roberts has misleadingly argued, the right to plead that defense
would be beyond the reach of the Legislature. Again, Roberts is far off the
mark in arguing as if the preservation of a statute of limitations defense is a
special breed of “right” that is absolute and not susceptible to the same
constitutional analysis applied by this Court in every other instance.
“Nowhere in this state's jurisprudence is it suggested that article I, section
11 flatly prohibits the legislature from altering or even abolishing certain
rights which existed at common law.” Cruz v. Wright, 765 P.2d 869, 871 (Utah
1988).
The Open Courts Clause does not protect the right to plead a statute
of limitations defense. 34 Even if it did, that right could be altered, and even

If a statute of limitations defense were somehow etched in legal stone, as
Roberts maintains, and the elimination of the statute of limitations by Utah
34
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eliminated, by the Legislature where, as with H.B. 279, revival of the timebarred claims was a rational means of addressing a clear evil (whether it be
characterized as social or economic).
1. The Open Courts Clause Does Not Limit the Power
of the Legislature to Eliminate the Defense that a
Claim Is Time Barred Because Such a Right Is Not
a Remedy and Did Not Exist at Common Law.
The Open Courts Claus protects only remedies that existed at common
law. Roberts argues that “defenses” are also protected by the Open Courts
Clause. For that proposition, Roberts cites Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002
UT 6, ¶ 38, 44 P.3d 663, and Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ¶ 46, 190 P.3d 1269.
Both of those cases, however, offer no support that “defenses” are within the
ambit of the Open Courts Clause, other than that people shall have access to
the courts to present whatever defenses they have.35 Miller simply quoted
Black’s Law Dictionary for a definition of the right to a day in court, and that

Code Ann. § 78B-2-308(3)(a) were held by the courts to be violative of the
Open Courts Clause, such a result would be not only wholly unjustified by
the text of the Open Courts Clause, existing case law, and any previous
constitutional analysis by this Court, but it would also be a gross violation
of the separation of power and system of checks and balances between the
judicial and legislative branches.
35 Utah Const. art. I, § 11 “[N]o person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil
cause to which he is a party.”
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definition happened to include the word “defend.” Miller, 2002 UT 6, ¶ 38,
44 P.3d 663 (“This constitutional right to a day in court is the ‘right and
opportunity, in a judicial tribunal, to litigate a claim, seek relief, or defend
one's rights.’ Black's Law Dictionary 402 (7th ed. 1999).”). Daines goes one step
further, and cites an opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that quoted
Black’s Law Dictionary for a definition of the “merits” of a case, which
included the word “defense.” 2008 UT 51, ¶ 46, 190 P.3d 1269 (“The ‘merits'
of a case are ‘the elements or grounds of a claim or defense.’” (citing Blue
Skies Alliance v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, 265 F. App'x 203, 207, 2008 WL
344750 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1010 (8th ed. 2004)))).
Roberts cites no other authority stating that a “defense” is in any way
protected by the Open Courts Clause other than having access to the courts.
See Roberts Brief at 31–33.
Vast expansions of constitutional protections should not be allowed
based on the definitions of Black’s Law Dictionary.
The interpretation of the protections afforded by the Utah
Constitution appropriately commences with a review of the
constitutional text. While we first look to the text's plain meaning
we recognize that constitutional “language . . . is to be read not
as barren words found in a dictionary but as symbols of historic
experience illumined by the presuppositions of those who
employed them.”
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Am. Bush v. City of S. Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ¶ 10, 140 P.3d 1235, 1239
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The plain language of the Open Courts Clause does not protect
“defenses,” but rather “remed[ies]” for “injury.” Utah Const. art. 1, section
11. Roberts has cited no authority, and made no argument, that historical
evidence of the framers’ intent supports an expansive reading of the
provision so as to include defenses—except relating to access to the courts to
present defenses.
The glaring fallacy in Roberts’s analysis is made conspicuous by the
fact that the Open Courts Clause protects common law rights, while any right
to plead a statute of limitations defense is legislatively created.
The common law [has] fixed no time as to the bringing of actions.
Limitations derive their authority from statutes.” U. S. v.
Thompson, 98 U. S. 490, 25 L. Ed. 194. And in the absence of
statutes “there can be no bar arising from lapse of time.”
Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 487, 488, 25 L. Ed. 628; 1 Wood,
Lim. §§ 1, 2.
Ireland, 61 P. at 904.
This Court has consistently interpreted the Open Courts Clause to
apply to remedies that existed at common law, not defenses created by statute.
See, e.g., Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, ¶ 10, 103 P.3d 135, 139 (Under the Open
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Courts Clause, “citizens of Utah have a right to a remedy for an injury.”
(emphasis added)); Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Utah 1996) (“In
deciding whether this subsection abrogated such a remedy, we must examine
the common law . . . .” (emphasis added)); Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc.
v. Herm Hughes & Son, Inc., 782 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1989) (“The legislature
may create, define, and modernize the law. However, it does not have
unbridled power to deny to contemporary plaintiffs their existing common
law rights and remedies.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citing Berry
at 717 P.2d at 676 and n.3).
2. A Statute Survives Scrutiny Under the Open Courts
Clause Even If It Abrogates a Remedy that Existed
at Common Law When, as with H.B. 279, the
Abrogation is a Reasonable Means for Addressing
a Clear Social or Economic Evil.
Roberts grossly mischaracterizes the cases interpreting the Open
Courts Clause by failing to recognize that, since Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
the Utah Legislature may abrogate a constitutionally protected remedy so
long as either (i) the legislature provides a reasonable alternative remedy or
(ii) there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and the
elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable
means for achieving the objective. 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985).
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Child sexual abuse is a clear evil. “Sexual abuse is one of the most
damaging violations a person can commit against another person. Sexual
abuse of a child is even more heinous because of the child’s vulnerable
position.” Khorram, Crossing the Limit Line, 391; see also Stogner v. California,
539 U.S. 607, 651 (2003) (“When a child molester commits his offense, he is
well aware the harm will plague the victim for a lifetime.”).
So, too, it is a “social evil” that victims are unable, due to no fault of
their own, to seek justice in a court of law merely because the statute of
limitations has run. As is made abundantly clear in the text and legislative
history of H.B. 279, the revival of time-barred claims is rationally related to
addressing that evil.
The public policy objective argued by the plaintiff finds support
from numerous commentators. In one significant example,
Professor Marci Hamilton observes that “[l]egislation that
eliminates the civil [statute of limitations] or includes a discovery rule
is supported by various studies on the long-term effects of child
molestation and the likely delay in disclosure. Researchers in various
studies have found—specifically in men who were sexually
abused as children—that long-term adaptation will often include
sexual problems, dysfunctions or compulsions, confusion and
struggles over gender and sexual identity, homophobia and
confusion about sexual orientation, problems with intimacy,
shame, guilt and self-blame, low self-esteem, negative selfimages, increased anger, and conflicts with authority figures.
There is also an increased rate of substance abuse, a tendency to
deny and delegitimize the traumatic experience, symptoms of
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[p]ost [t]raumatic [s]tress [d]isorder, and increased probability
of fear and depression for all victims. Often, it is not until years
after the sexual abuse that victims experience these negative
outcomes. As clinician Mic Hunter has observed: ‘Some of the
effects of sexual abuse do not become apparent until the victim
is an adult and a major life event, such as marriage or birth of a
child, takes place. Therefore, a child who seemed unharmed by
childhood abuse can develop crippling symptoms years
later....’” (Footnotes omitted.) M. Hamilton, “The Time Has
Come for a Restatement of Child Sex Abuse,” 79 Brook. L. Rev.
397, 404–405 (2014). Another salutary effect of revival statutes like §
52–577d is that “lawsuits filed under window legislation have led to
the public identification of previously unknown child predators, which
reduces the odds that children will be abused in the future.” Id.,
at 405.
Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 514–15 (Conn.
2015) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See also Heidi L. Neuendorf, The
Judicial Impediment on Legislative Lawmaking in Stratmeyer v. Stratmeyer, 44
S.D. L. Rev. 115, 123 (1999) (While the “sexual abuse of children is a tragic
and increasingly common issue today . . . . even more tragic and increasingly
common is the issue of adults who suffered sexual abuse as children and are
coping with it in their adult lives.”).
VI. Contrary to Roberts’s Characterization, the Weight of
Authority Across the Country Favors Revival of Time-Barred
Claims Without Limitation by Any Per Se Rule.
Roberts grossly mischaracterizes the state of the nation’s law by
arguing that “[t]he substantial majority of states to have considered the issue
52

(a total of 24 including Utah) hold that expired claims cannot subsequently
be revived.” Roberts Brief at 39. Roberts has conflated (1) a court merely
holding that its state constitution offers some protection (as opposed to the
zero protection under the federal constitution) with (2) a court holding that
a legislature cannot, even with express legislative intent, revive time-barred
claims. The Certified Questions do not contemplate whether Utah offers
some protection for a defense that the statute of limitations has run. Utah law
holds that is a substantive right. The Certified Questions contemplate how
the courts should address express statutory language that time-barred claims
are to be revived. The weight of authority across the country favors the
power of the Utah Legislature to do just that.
First, under federal law, the legislature can, without any doubt, revive
time-barred claims. Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 628–29 (1885); Chase Secs.
Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 316 (1945) (“[C]ertainly it cannot be said that
lifting the bar of a statute of limitations so as to restore a remedy lost through
mere lapse of time is per se an offense against the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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The federal approach, which pre-dated the adoption of Utah’s Due
Process constitutional provision,36 finding no constitutional protection
against merely reviving a time-barred claim, is followed by the courts of
nineteen states (Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wyoming). Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119
A.3d 462, 509 (Conn. 2015) (surveying states and ultimately holding
Connecticut would follow federal approach).
An additional six states have not addressed the matter, and therefore
provide no support for Roberts’s position that a state should even deviate
from the federal approach, let alone depart so far from it as to create an
absolute bar against revival of time-barred claims. See id. (surveying states
and only identifying 44 states to have addressed the issue).
Eight states, quite unlike Utah, have constitutional provisions that bar
retroactive applications of statutes. Roberts Brief at 29 n.17. Even with an
express constitutional provision against retroactive application, Texas does

36

See Br. of Amicus Curiae, at 4–6.
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not follow a per se rule, but instead applies a balancing test. Robinson v.
Crown Cork & Seal Co., 335 S.W.3d 126, 145 (Tex. 2010).
One state, Vermont, has a statutory prohibition against retroactive
legislation. 1 Vt. Stat. Ann. § 214(b).37
Directly contrary to Roberts’s proposed per se rule, Roberts concedes
“two states hold that expiration of a statute of limitation creates a
constitutionally-protected vested right that must be balanced with the
legislature’s purpose for imposing retroactivity.” Roberts Brief at 29 n.17
(citing Segura v. Frank, 630 So. 2d 714, 728–31 (La. 1994) and Soc'y Ins. v. Labor
& Indus. Review Comm'n, 786 N.W.2d 385, 395–97 (Wis. 2010)).
Additionally, New York applies its own test to determine the validity
of the revival of time-barred claims. Gallewski v. H. Hentz & Co., 93 N.E.2d
620, 624 (N.Y. 1950) (“[T]he Legislature may constitutionally revive a
personal cause of action where the circumstances are exceptional and are
such as to satisfy the court that serious injustice would result to plaintiffs not
guilty of any fault if the intention of the Legislature were not effectuated.”).

Utah has the opposite, a codified rule that statutes are not to have a
retroactive effect unless that intent is expressly declared by the Legislature. Utah
Code. § 68-3-3.

37
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Hence, thirty-seven states offer no support for Roberts’s position. What
of the other thirteen? Roberts argues that decisions in five states support the
view that “vested rights” protect against legislative revival of time-barred
claims, Roberts Brief at 29–30, n. 17, but one of them determined the statute
did not impair a vested right and three of them did not address a statute that
expressed the intent to revive claims, instead dealing with, for example, the
mere lengthening of time to file a claim. See supra 17 n.12.
Roberts then argues seven states do not allow revival of time-barred
claims based on a state due process clause. Roberts Brief at 29–30, n.17. Of
those seven, four of them addressed statutes with no expression of legislative
intent that there be a retroactive effect. See supra 38 n.32.
The last state, Utah, with the dubious exception of Apotex, has
established that the Legislature may enact retroactive legislation that affects
vested or substantive rights, so long as the Legislature clearly expresses that
intent. See supra, at 18–29. And, addressing whether an amendment to the
statute of limitations could revive time-barred claims for child sexual abuse,
this Court first looked to whether the Legislature had made any expression
of intent that it be retroactive, then, only after determining there was no such
intent, concluded it could not otherwise be given a retroactive effect because
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it affected substantive, not merely procedural rights. Roark, 893 P.2d at 1062,
1063.
Roberts is left then with four cases supporting his notion that “the
majority of states to have considered the issue . . . hold that expired claims
cannot subsequently be revived,” and none of them address a statute like H.B.
279, where the Legislature has engaged in extraordinary efforts to
demonstrate the compelling need to revive time-barred claims. That is
hardly authority upon which this Court can rely to usurp legislative power
by exercising a judicial veto of a statute where the Legislature has researched
and carefully balanced the interests at stake and unmistakably declared its
intention that a statute is to revive time-barred claims of child sexual abuse.
CONCLUSION
A statute of limitations defense against claims of child sexual abuse is
not in a category all its own, absolutely protected under a court-made “black
letter” rule against revival of the claims. Contrary to the principles of stare
decisis, established constitutional analysis, and the fundamental separation
of legislative and judicial powers, Roberts contends he is protected against
revival of the claims against him, regardless of the interests at stake and
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regardless of legislative policy and expressed intent regarding revival of the
previously time-barred claims.
Although there are snippets in certain Utah cases, particularly Apotex,
that appear, without any modern constitutional analysis, to adopt the
Nineteenth Century notion of absolute protection for such “vested rights,”
the courts would be engaging in a radical expansion of judicial review to
disregard a revival statute like H.B. 279, the sole purpose of which is to
revive time-barred claims of child sexual abuse. The respect for the
legislative prerogative has been repeatedly pronounced by Utah courts for
well over a century in the well-established rule that, even where
“substantive law” or “vested rights” are affected, a statute is to be given
retroactive application if the Legislature, as in this case, has expressed its
intent that the statute is to be applied in that manner.
The courts could disregard H.B. 279 and frustrate the clear expressions
of legislative intent with respect to that statute only if there is a clear
violation of the Utah or United States Constitutions. Since the Utah
Legislature was acting well within its constitutional authority in enacting
H.B. 279, the revival statute must be upheld. Both questions certified to this
Court by the Federal Court should be answered in the affirmative.
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